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EDITORIAL
It has been reported that representatives

Standard Depreciation of the bureau of internal revenue have
Rates

recently called upon certain industries
to furnish data concerning “standard depreciation rates” on the
various types of machinery and other property used in those
industries. When the representatives of the bureau were in
formed that no such standard rates had been compiled or seemed
desirable, the bureau stated that it would proceed with the
preparation of standard rates of depreciation to be published for
the guidance of internal-revenue agents. It further appeared
that while the rates to be published would be intended to be
merely advisory they would be promulgated officially in the form
of a treasury bulletin and, of course, would have a great deal of
effect. Agents would find themselves practically bound to apply
those rates in every ordinary case. This matter was considered
by the executive committee of the American Institute of Ac
countants and a letter of protest was written to the commissioner
of internal revenue, which we publish by permission.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir:
It has come to the attention of the executive committee of the
American Institute of Accountants that the bureau of internal
revenue is resuming active consideration of a plan to promulgate
schedules of uniform depreciation rates for various industries.
Former proposals of such a plan have encountered wide criti
cism from many of the industries concerned. The executive com
mittee of the American Institute of Accountants feels strongly
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that the establishment of uniform depreciation rates in any or all
industries would be unwise and impracticable.
This opinion is the result of long observation and experience in
the practice of accounting by the men who constitute the execu
tive committee. It is felt that regardless of any theoretical
advantages which uniform depreciation rates may appear to
offer, the practical difficulties in the way of their application are
insurmountable. The committee feels that it is not possible to
draft a schedule of uniform rates, even if it is attempted to provide
the widest elasticity, which can be fairly applied in all cases within
any particular industry.
The committee has directed me to record its opinion on behalf of
the American Institute of Accountants, which is the purpose of
this letter.
Yours truly,
F. H. Hurdman,
President.

Every accountant will probably endorse
the opinion expressed by the executive
committee of the American Institute of
Accountants and it is sincerely to be hoped that the bureau of
internal revenue will not remain blind to the dangers which such a
scheme as that now suggested involves. It is interesting to recall
that about two years ago the commissioner of internal revenue
issued a pamphlet entitled Depreciation studies of the bureau of
internal revenue undertaken with the voluntary cooperation of or
ganizations nationally representative of various industries or
branches of industries. This pamphlet was referred to a special
committee of the American Institute of Accountants and there
was a certain amount of correspondence and conference before
the committee rendered its report. The treasury department
gave rather wide publicity to the efforts which were being made.
No opportunity was given to discuss the fundamental question of
the utility of so-called standard depreciation rates, but the
Institute’s committee, after careful consideration of the question,
concluded its report in the following statement: “The whole
question of depreciation rates is fraught with almost insuperable
difficulties, owing to the intimate connection therewith of obsoles
cence and maintenance expenses; and the establishment of an
unassailable and sensitive scale of rates for any industry is as yet
far in the future. The committee wishes to emphasize the fact
that in its opinion the plant of no single concern is comparable
with that of any other, and that in fixing its depreciation rates
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every corporation should have full latitude in considering its own
peculiar situation. That the studies made by industrial groups
will, however, be helpful to the individuals composing such
groups and to the members of the accountancy profession is un
questionable.” And this is about as far as one can go in com
mendation of a plan of determining so-called standard rates of
depreciation. There is no doubt at all that an industry which can
compile what seem to be fair average rates for depreciation of its
own machinery, etc., will render a service of value to all the persons
concerned in that industry. Such a schedule of rates would serve
as a useful measure of the probable life of equipment or other prop
erty of an individual concern, and if the actual depreciation ex
perienced by one concern were greater or less than the standard,
that fact itself would be cause for an investigation of the whole
scheme of estimating loss due to depreciation. But that is very
different from placing in the hands of a tax assessor a measuring
stick which he will apply in all cases and by which he will deter
mine the amount of depreciation to be allowed the taxpayer. In
the first case the schedule would be purely advisory. In the
second, it would be in grave danger of becoming mandatory. It
does not seem probable that the treasury department will persist
in its efforts to compile a list of standard rates. If it does do so,
it will lead to an increased number of disputed tax cases, and that
is something which the department should seek to avoid.
An article which appeared in The
Journal of Accountancy for April
on the subject of “earnings per share’’
seems to have attracted a good deal of attention. The author,
Andreas S. Natvig, was concerned chiefly with the method of
computing earnings “per share” and proceeded on the assumption
that stock values, especially on the markets, were dominated to a
great extent by the ratio of earnings to stock outstanding. He
then offered several plans for determining the percentage. The
whole article was interesting and helpful, but there is one basic
principle which may be challenged. We do not believe that the
earnings “per share” play as important a part in the creation of
market values as a good many people seem to think. It would be
folly to say that the amount of earnings theoretically applicable
to each share of stock had no bearing at all upon stock quotations.
The corporation which is earning $10 for every share of stock
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outstanding will almost certainly sell at a price higher than the
shares of a corporation which earns $5 a share. So much may be
admitted, but during the past two or three years there has been a
great deal of nonsense talked and written about earnings “per
share” as a positive guide to market values. We have been told
that market price should be ten times the earnings, or fifteen
times, and, in some unusually ill-considered announcements, the
public was advised to expect market value twenty times as great
as the earnings “per share.” Then came the depression and
values went down in many cases to a point less than ten times the
earnings. The earnings, however, continued at a fairly level rate
while the market prices were jumping up and down in acrobatic
convulsions. The earnings “per share” had nothing whatever to
do with these gymnastic performances. The truth was that
prices had been too high in proportion to the earnings and when
they dropped they dropped too low in some cases, while in others
they have not yet dropped low enough. But if earnings “per
share ” were the controlling factor, which many people would have
us believe, we should not have the quick fluctuations of the stock
market which make it interesting and at the same time perilous.
It probably would be informative if one
would take the trouble to review the
earnings of any corporation in which he
is interested over the past fifteen or twenty years and compare
the earnings “per share” with the market quotations. In the
great majority of cases he would find, we believe, that while
earnings have been fairly steady, market quotations have been
uneven and apparently not greatly dependent upon anything
more than psychology. Some of the corporations whose earnings
seem exceptionally high have not achieved a market favor com
mensurate with their apparent position. Such corporations may
have adopted the policy of paying very small dividends and of
plowing back into the company practically all of the profits, with
the result that earnings have increased in later years and the
company has become sound and permanent. In such cases the
principal “per share” is really more indicative of value than the
earnings “per share.” An illustration of this condition is found in
the case of some of the banks which have been piling up surplus
upon surplus and paying only a small percentage in dividends.
Their market quotations are dependent almost entirely upon
324
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surplus accumulated. Earnings “per share’’ are not of much
significance, although in the long run the shareholder who holds
on must come to the time when the accumulation of property will
be divided more freely to those who own it. The point which we
are attempting to emphasize now is simply that it is a fallacy to
allow oneself to be governed by earnings “per share’’ in estimating
probable market value. A market based upon earnings “per
share” would be ideal, but experience has taught us that it is not
apt to occur.
We have received the text of an arbitra
tor’s award in the case of a corporation
against a firm of accountants practising
in New England. The report has been sent to us with the request
that the names of the persons concerned be not divulged. The
accountants in the case have no objection to the publication of
their names, but the plaintiff prefers to have the matter dealt
with anonymously. As a matter of fact, it makes little difference
whether the names are published or not as in the present case the
interesting question is one of principle. It appears that the
corporation engaged the services of the accountants, whom we
shall hereafter call the firm, to make an audit of the corporation’s
books for the fiscal year ended May 31, 1920. The firm had made
similar audits in two preceding years. The claim of the corpora
tion was that the accountants had performed their work negli
gently and failed to disclose the fact that certain Liberty bonds
were not in the custody of the treasurer of the company or in the
custody of any other person holding for the company and that as
a result of the alleged negligence of the firm the corporation had
sustained a loss measured by the value of the bonds.

Award in Case of
Alleged Negligence

The arbitrator’s award is interesting for

Haste Does Not Affect several reasons. One of the funda
Responsibility

mentals decided by the arbitrator was
that the responsibility of the accountants was not diminished by
the urgency of the corporation to have the report hastened or by
the difficulties which the firm found in completing the audit in
time. This is a matter of interest to every accountant, for there
is no practitioner who is not at some time or other urged to hasten
his work so as to present a certificate or report prior to a certain
date. It is quite customary for the accountant to demur and to
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state that it will not be possible for him to complete the work
fully by the date mentioned. It is customary for the client in
such cases to be unreasonable in insisting upon excessive speed
and even to offer to relieve the accountant of responsibility. The
present decision is, therefore, helpful in determining the exact
amount of responsibility which the accountant assumes. It
appears that haste or difficulties in completing an audit do not
relieve the accountant of the burden of responsibility which is
there. This does not mean necessarily that the accountant is
financially responsible. The point is that to whatever extent his
responsibility would go when there was ample time and no ob
stacle, to the same extent his responsibility would go when there
were apparent excuses for imperfect work.

The second point involved in the arbi
trator’s award is the method of the
accountant’s verification of alleged
assets, in the present case certain Liberty bonds. We are told
that at the time of the audit bonds worth $15,000 were shown on
the books of a brokerage house as being in safe keeping for the
corporation, when actually bonds worth only $10,000 were on
hand and the other $5,000 had been wrongfully hypothecated.
Furthermore, $20,000 of bonds had been purchased upon the order
and for the account of the brokers by another firm of brokers but
had not been delivered. The first brokers had a running account
with the second and were indebted to the second. The record
shows many transactions between these two brokerage houses.
Bonds worth $20,000 were at the time of the audit a part of the
collateral held by the second firm of brokers to secure the in
debtedness of the first brokerage firm, and delivery could have been
obtained by the first firm only after the margin of collateral value
over indebtedness was large enough to permit the withdrawal of
the funds. Some time after the remaining $10,000 of bonds in
the safe-keeping account were also wrongfully hypothecated to
secure obligations of the first brokerage house. This concern
passed into bankruptcy and all the bonds of the corporation were
lost to the corporation—the original $15,000 being held by the
persons to whom they were hypothecated and the $20,000 of bonds
which had never been delivered to the first brokers being held by
the second as collateral for the first’s indebtedness. When the
accountants undertook the investigation they found that the
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corporation was carrying $35,000 par value of Liberty bonds as an
asset item, with a book value of $31,990, and the accountants were
informed that the bonds were with a brokerage firm. The ac
countants thereupon went to the office of the brokers and found
entries in the books there which they accepted without further
verification. In the report of the accountants appeared the
following paragraph: “United States Liberty bonds, $31,990.
This total is made up of $20,000 par value of the third ¼, 1928,
United States Liberty bonds carried at $18,664, and $15,000 par
value of fourth 4¼, 1928, United States Liberty bonds carried
at $13,326. The latter includes $5,000 of original subscription
carried at par.” The text of the arbitrator’s award on this point
is of interest. He said:

“It is to be noted that the accountants did not report that
verification had been made nor the method of verification. At
the time the audit was made, X, although he had already begun
the course of dishonest dealings which eventually led to the loss
of the bonds, had a good reputation and the firm . . . was a
reputable and unquestionably solvent brokerage concern. It is
conceded that there was no evidence before me that the ac
countants should have known or suspected at that time that X
was anything other than an honest man nor that the firm was
anything other than a solvent, reputable brokerage firm. The
relationship between X and--------- Company was very close and
was based upon a course of satisfactory dealings between them,
by which the--------- Company had greatly benefited.
“I find further that the--------- Company would have regarded
custody by X & Co. in a safe-keeping account as a satisfactory
way for its treasurer to keep the bonds and that the officers in fact
understood that the bonds were ‘with the brokers’ and not in
X’s individual custody.
“The evidence of the expert witnesses as to the duties of an
accountant in the verification of securities held by an outside
custodian was somewhat conflicting. The three who are to be
regarded as disinterested expert witnesses are Messrs. A, B and C.
One point of difference between them has to do with the insistence
upon a certificate from the custodian in all cases where actual ac
count of securities is not made. Messrs. A and B thought the book
examination was at least as good as a certificate in this case. Mr. C
thought proper accounting practice required a certificate in all
cases, and although on cross-examination he admitted in effect that
the book examination would have personally satisfied him never
theless he would have required a certificate as a matter of practice.
“The other main point of difference was that Mr. B thought
that in every case the auditor should report what he had done by
way of verification. The other two regarded this as something
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for the auditor himself to decide. On this point, it seems to me
that an auditor’s report is not defective in a case where not the
least suspicion has been aroused if it fails to report the steps taken
by the auditor for verification. Such detail is really intended ‘to
pass the buck’ and is inserted to protect the auditor. An auditor
who does not rehearse his steps shows a willingness to assume a
greater responsibility than one who does.
“However, it is unnecessary to determine what, if anything,
constituted negligence on the part of the defendants in this regard.
I have come to the conclusion that the only question requiring a
decision is whether the ultimate loss of the bonds came as a proxi
mate result of any act or omission of the accountants which could
from any viewpoint I can adopt be regarded as negligence. This
issue of proximate cause can be narrowed by eliminating omissions
on the part of the accountants which I think were clearly not
negligent and considering only the one omission which might be
considered negligent if it were necessary to decide the issue of
negligence. All the expert witnesses were agreed that the duty of
the accountants would have been fully and unquestionably per
formed if they had verified the bonds either by count or by
certificate and had reported the method of verification in their
report. It was not negligent to fail to count the bonds. ... I
find that any action that would have followed any report that
might have been based on the blotter entries would not have
saved the bonds. The cause of the loss was the dishonesty of the
treasurer of the--------- Company. To have saved the company
its loss, removal of the treasurer or removal of the bonds from his
control was essential. Anything short of this in my opinion would
not have been sufficient. ...
“In summary, I can not bring myself to the belief that the cause
of the loss was what the auditors did or did not do, but the loss
was caused by the fact that the treasurer who had the implicit
confidence of his associates, and of everyone else apparently at
that time, was in reality a thief who misappropriated $15,000 of
bonds for which the auditors can in no way be held responsible;
and $20,000 of bonds which up to the time of the auditors’ report
he had been delinquent in getting into his custody for the benefit
of the--------- Company, but which, even if the auditors had done
what the plaintiffs now claim they ought to have done, would
have continued in the same jeopardy, viz. would have been under
the dishonest treasurer’s control and for that reason lost to the
company.
“I find for the defendants.”

The decision of the arbitrator in this
case is fair. It would have been some
what unreasonable to hold the ac
countant responsible for failure to disclose something that could
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only have been disclosed by unusual research when there was no
cause to believe that anything was amiss. The gist of the award
is much the same as that of the court decision in the well known
Kingston Cotton Mills case, namely, that the accountant is to
exercise reasonable diligence, and having done that he has per
formed his duty. The whole question of the interpretation of the
word “reasonable” has been vexing accountants and lawyers for
many years, but it seems safe to assume that in a case such as
that with which we are now dealing, where there was nothing in
the history of earlier years to indicate laxity or wrong-doing and
where the acceptance of an entry in the books of a third party
was really in conformity with common practice, the accountant
was not guilty of a lack of reasonable diligence. Obviously it
would be desirable if it were practicable in all cases for every item
in the accounts to be traced to its ultimate source and destination,
but that can not be done. The accountant’s duty is to assure
himself to his own satisfaction that the accounts are a correct
reflection of facts, but he must not be satisfied if there is the
slightest reason to doubt the accuracy of the figures which are
placed before him. To put the matter in other words, it may be
said that the accountant’s duty is to render a report based upon
evidence which is conclusive to himself. He should place himself
in the position of a third person whose financial interests are con
cerned in the solvency of the business under audit, and if after
investigation he feels that there is nothing amiss and that nothing
has transpired which would militate against complete confidence,
he has done what is required of him.
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